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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the cost of a product rises, a consumer must decide if he really
needs the product. If he doesn't, sales will decline and the manufac-
turer might be forced to stop producing the product. If the product
is essential, then the consumer will pay irrespective of costs.
On first glance, this "natural selection" approach might seem
to be an appropriate means of ridding the market of unsafe prod-
ucts. If the consumer will bear the cost of liability for the unsafe
product, then the product should remain available. The problem,
however, is that the type of product which is likely to fall under
the title of "unavoidably unsafe" is not a product which is used by
a large percentage of the population. Drugs and other medical and
pharmaceutical products may be used by a relatively small seg-
ment of the consuming public and therefore when the cost of liabil-
ity is passed on, it will be especially hard to bear. Yet if the product
is really necessary, as many drugs are, the individual may have no
choice but to pay. Thus the exception to strict liability provided in
comment k10 is well justified. State of the art evidence is indispensi-
ble in bringing this important exception into play because without
it, the product cannot be shown to be "unavoidably unsafe."
JAMES T. MURRAY, JR.
STRICT LIABILITY AND THE
SCIENTIFICALLY UNKNOWABLE RISK
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment deals with the question of whether or not a
manufacturer should be excused from liability in a "strict liability"
case because the injury resulted from a danger that was a scientifi-
cally unknowable risk prior to the injury. Basically, this question
is concerned with defining the outer limits of the concept of "defec-
tive" products and, thereby, the scope of the strict liability theory
in products liability cases.' The black letter rule of section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability on sellers
or manufacturers if their product is in a "defective condition un-
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
1. 2 L. FRUMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(4)(3), p. 3-332.
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reasonably dangerous to the user.' 2 In defining the terms which
make up this phrase, it is necessary that the underlying policy
considerations of the strict liability theory be taken into account.
Before discussing the question, it is necessary to define exactly
what the danger involved in a case like this is. The danger is one
which is a scientifically unknowable risk prior to the injury. Up
until the time that such an injury occurs, not only was there no
indication of the particular risk, there was no way of discovering
it even with the use of all of the scientific tests available.
It must be remembered that it is the risk which is unknowable
rather than the method of protecting against that risk. Therefore,
this situation differs from the blood transfusion cases where the
patient develops serum hepatitis infection:3 The risk in the blood
transfusion situation is known to the supplier. However, although
he knows the risk is present, there has been, at least until recently,
nothing he could do to protect against it. In the case with which
this paper is concerned, there is nothing the manufacturer or seller
can do to discover the risk itself. Although the two situations are
quite similar for some purposes, they differ in certain respects so
that some of the policy considerations applicable to the one situa-
tion are not applicable to the other. One of the most important
differences is that in the blood case it is possible to warn the patient
of the risk, whereas, if the risk is unknown, it is obviously impossi-
ble to give any warning.'
The problem of the scientifically unknowable risk arises most
frequently with products which interact with living organisms. An
example of such a product is the cigarette5 Although cigarettes
have been around for many years, it has not always been known
that their use could cause lung cancer.' Other products which are
frequently involved in cases dealing with this issue are drugs and
insecticides. The reason for this is that it is not always possible to
say how a living organism is going to react to a foreign substance.
Although this problem exists with regard to plants and animals,7
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (Hereinafter referred to as
RESTATEMENT § 402A).
3. See Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972), and
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966).
4. As to warnings, see RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment j.
5. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), and Lartigue v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
6. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., Ltd., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
7. Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1969), and Alman Bros, Farm and Feed Mill, Inc. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.2d
1295 (5th Cir. 1971).
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as well as humans, it is particularly evident in the case of humans
because of the difficulties in testing the product. It is much more
difficult to carry out a thorough testing of the product when the
tests must eventually include tests on individuals.8
II. THE STRICT LIABILITY THEORY
A. Some Basic Rules
As has been noted in the introduction to this symposium, the
concept of strict liability as it applies to products liability cases was
first used in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.9 This case
became the foundation of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.'0 One of the reasons for the adoption of this rule is
to ease the burden of proof on the plaintiff in that it removes his
burden of proving specific acts of negligence. It also protects the
plaintiff from some of the technical defenses available to defen-
dants under the warranty theory."
While the strict liability theory does ease some of the burdens
on the plaintiff, it is not intended to impose absolute liability on
sellers or make them insurers of their products.2 A manufacturer
or seller is not subjected to liability solely because he put a product
into circulation and it was involved in an injury producing event."
Therefore, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the product
was in a "defective" condition when it left the control of the manu-
8. Winthrop Laboratories Division of Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Crocker, CCH Prod. Liab.
R. 7089 (Tex. Civ. App. Nov. 21, 1973).
9. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
10. RESTATEMENT § 402A. This section provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
II. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
12. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Netzel v. State Sand and
Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971); Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); and 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 123 (1972).
13. P. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of"Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969).
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facturer or seller.14 This also involves the concept of the product
being "unreasonably dangerous" to the user or consumer. 15 Ob-
viously, the plaintiff must also prove that the defect in the product
was the cause of the injury.
The crucial issue involved in applying the strict liability rules
to cases involving an injury caused by a product where the danger
was a scientifically unknowable risk is to determine whether or not
such a product is, in fact, "defective" because it is "unreasonably
dangerous" to the consumer. Therefore, the definitions which have
been applied to these terms will be discussed below as they apply
to this specific situation.
B. The Underlying Policy Considerations
The two traditional theories upon which products liability cases
were based, negligence and warranty, imposed rather heavy bur-
dens upon the plaintiff. The courts found these burdens to be unsa-
tisfactory and therefore developed the rules of strict liability. Strict
liability developed as a vehicle of social policy and is geared toward
the protection of the public safety."
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., the California
court stated that:
(t)he purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves .... 11
The court was obviously concerned with protecting the injured
individual who is in no position to protect himself and who is
probably in no position to carry the financial burden caused by his
injury.
Therefore, two basic reasons are given for the imposition of
strict liability in tort: (1)the manufacturer is in a better position to
spread the loss; and (2) the manufacturer is in a better position to
protect against the risk. 8 Although many policy considerations
have been expressed by the multitude of authors who have written
14. Id. at 563; see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed.
1971).
15. RESTATEMENT § 402A; J. Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5,
15 (1965); and 2 FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODuCTs LIABILITY § 16A(4)(e).
16. 63 Am. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 123 (1972).
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, _ 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
18. Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 121 N.J. Super, 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972).
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on the subject of strict liability, these are the two principle ones
upon which the imposition of liability has been based.
Although the courts are interested in protecting the user or
consumer of the product, they have repeatedly stated that the man-
ufacturer is not the insurer of his product. 9 If this is so, clearly
there are limits on the strict liability theory."0 In determining what
these limits are, the policy considerations upon which the imposi-
tion of liability is based must be looked at. If these considerations
do not fit the situation of the particular case, it would appear that
there should be no liability upon the manufacturer."1
III. DEFINING THE TERMS
A. "Defective"
In order for a plaintiff to recover under the strict liability
theory, it is necessary for him to prove that the product was "defec-
tive. 22 The courts, however, have had difficulty in giving this term
a definition. There is no truly satisfactory definition of the term
which can be generally applied and, therefore, the courts have dealt
with it on a case-by-case basis.23
The typical definition of "defective" includes the concepts of
what the user expects from the product and what the normal use
of the product is. The comments to section 402A state that a
product is defective if it is in a "condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer" and that a product is not defective if it is "safe
for normal handling and consumption. 24 Prosser has said that:
The prevailing interpretation of 'defective' is that the product
does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary con-
sumer as to its safety. . ..
The nature of the product and who the foreseeable user is would
seem to become important factors in determining the existence of
a defect under this definition of the term.
The existence of a condition which renders the product "inade-
quate, 112 then, makes the product "defective." This is somewhat
19. See note 12.
20. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., Ltd., 328 F.2d 3, 13 (8th Cir. 1964).
21. Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1969).
22. See note 14.
23. 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1972).
24. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comments g and h; see alsoWis. J.I.-CIVIL § 3200 (1971).
25. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, p. 659 (4th ed. 1971).
26. 2 FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 16A(4)(e), pp. 3-305, 3-306.
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simplistic, however, because, under the Restatement view, the
product must be "unreasonably dangerous" to the user or con-
sumer. Also, the existence of a warning may act to cure the defect.
B. "Unreasonably Dangerous"
To impose liability upon a manufacturer or seller under section
402A of the Restatement, the defective condition of the product
must make it "unreasonably dangerous" to the user. This term, as
a qualification of "defective," has involved problems in defining it
similar to the problems courts have had with defining "defect."
The definitions which have been given to this term have some-
times been quite similar to those which have been given to "defec-
tive." One such definition is:
A product is unreasonably dangerous when it is dangerous be-
yond that contemplated by the ordinary user who purchases it
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.?
This definition is substantially the same as that given to the term
by the authors of section 402A. 8
The concept of "unreasonably dangerous" has been limited
somewhat by the recognition that there are some products which
cannot possibly be made entirely safe. In Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prod. Corp. ,29 the court found that:
The requirement that the defect render the product 'unrea-
sonably dangerous' reflects a realization that many products
have both utility and danger. The determination that a product
is unreasonably dangerous, or not reasonably safe, means that,
on balance, the utility of the product does not outweigh the mag-
nitude of the danger?
By recognizing that the utility of the product is a factor in deter-
mining whether or not a product is unreasonably dangerous, the
court severely limits the importance of whether or not the product
was in fact dangerous beyond that contemplated by the ordinary
user. Instead of this being the sole criteria for finding the product
to be unreasonably dangerous, it becomes only one factor in this
determination.
27. WIs. J.I.-CIVIL § 3200 (1971).
28. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i.
29. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., CCH Prod. Liab. R. 7017 (5th Cir.
Sept. 10, 1973).
30. Id.
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C. The Effect of a Warning
In certain situations, a manufacturer may be required to give
a warning of a particular danger which may arise through the use
of his product. The existence of a condition which would otherwise
render a product defective and unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer may be offset by the manufacturer giving an adequate
warning of the danger.3 ' The reason for this is that:
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a
warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in a defective
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.3 1
When an adequate warning is given, the product is not defective
because the manufacturer has informed the consumer what he
should expect from the product in terms of its safety. Similarly, it
is not unreasonably dangerous because the consumer has been
made aware of how dangerous the product is.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITIONS TO SCIENTIFICALLY
UNKNOWABLE RISKS
A. Authorities Holding Unknowability of the Risk to be
Irrelevant
The question of whether a manufacturer should be held liable
under strict liability where the injury was caused by a danger which
was scientifically unknowable until the injury has occurred has lead
to different results from the various courts. The authors of articles
on this subject are also split on the issue.
The courts and authors who take the view that knowledge by
the manufacturer of the risk is not a factor in determining liability
under strict liability, base their view primarily on the concept that
strict liability imposes liability without consideration of the manu-
facturer's or seller's fault. They key factor is whether or not the
product was defective and the "fact that the. . . manufacturer was
unaware of the existence of the defect does not alter the fact that
it was defective. ' 33
The authorities following this reasoning look at the problem
31. Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904 (Ore. 1965); RESTATEMENT § 402A, comments j
and k; R. Patterson, Products Liability: The Manufacturer's Continuing Duty to Improve
His Product or Warn of Defects After Sale, 62 ILL. BAR J. 92 (Oct. 1973).
32. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment j.
33. P. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 861 (1963).
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from the time of trial rather than the time of sale or the time of
injury. This approach is exemplified in Keeton's definition of the
term "unreasonably dangerous":
A drug or any other product is unreasonably dangerous, I sug-
gest, if and only if, a reasonable man, with knowledge of the
condition of the product and an appreciation of all the risks as
found to exist at the time of the trial, would not now market the
product at all or would do so pursuant to a different set of
warnings and instructions as to use.34
By making the time of trial the critical time for knowledge of the
risk, no distinction is made between risks that are scientifically
knowable and those that are not.
In Green v. American Tobacco Co.,35 the Florida Supreme
Court was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, pursuant to a Florida statutory certification proce-
dure, to answer the question whether that state imposes "absolute
liability" for breach of implied warranty upon the manufacturer of
cigarettes for death caused by use of its product when the manufac-
turer could not have known that cigarette smoking carried with it
the risk of causing lung cancer. The court held:
Upon the critical point, our decisions conclusively establish
the principal that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge
of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to
his liability on the theory of implied warranty. .... 31
Although this case dealt with the implied warranty theory, the
reasoning for the decision indicates that the same ruling would be
appropriate under the strict liability theory. The only reason for
even considering the seller's knowledge, according to the court,
was to determine policy considerations .3 The contention that the
product's wholesomeness should be determined on any standard
other than its "actual safety for human consumption, when sup-
plied for that purpose," was expressly rejected. 8
The Florida court has continued to apply this reasoning in light
of section 402A and its comments. In two cases dealing with the
34. P. Keeton, Some Observations About the Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescrip-
tion Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 CAL. L. REV. 149, 158 (1968); see also P.
Keeton, supra note 13, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 56.
35. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1969).
36. Id. at 170.
37. Id. at 171.
38. Id. at 173.
19741
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
blood transfusion problem," the court reaffirmed its position that
the knowledge of the manufacturer or seller is irrelevant. Although
the risk was known in these cases, the court's decisions don't distin-
guish this situation from the one where risk is unknowable. The
only question in Florida is whether the product was in a condition
not contemplated by the user or consumer.
In another blood transfusion case, Brody v. Overlook
Hospital,40 a New Jersey court also adopted the view that the fact
the defendant exercised "due care" is not relevant. In a strict
liability case, the court said, liability is based upon the fact of the
injury's occurrence as a result of the use of a defective product.
The imposition of strict liability is predicated, not upon fault,
but upon physical control over the defective product at the time
when the product is in fact defective. (This does not, however,
mean a degree of control to such an extent that the defect could
theoretically be eliminated by the controller.)41
Again, the fact that the manufacturer was not at fault or could do
nothing about the risk, whether he knew of or could have known
of its existence or not, makes no difference. The manufacturer,
under this approach, must produce a safe product or adequately
warn against any risk. If it doesn't, it will be subject to liability.
When the position is taken that the question of whether a prod-
uct is "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous" is to be determined
from the consumer's point of view and with the knowledge of the
facts after an injury has occurred, the fact that the risk was scientif-
ically unknowable makes no difference. By adopting this position,
the manufacturer is made an insurer of his product when it is used
as intended.42
B. Authorities holding that there is no liability where the risk is
unknowable
Although there is a general recognition that "defective" and
"unreasonably dangerous" do, in fact, involve what is contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer, there are a number of decisions
holding that there is no liability imposed upon the manufacturer
when the danger which caused the injury was a scientifically un-
39. Rostocki v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973), and
Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
40. 121 N.J. Super, 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972).
41. Id. at -, 296 A.2d at 675.
42. See P. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability,
18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947 (1964).
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knowable risk. As was stated by Dean Prosser:
Thus far the courts have tended to hold the manufacturer to
a high standard of care in preparing and testing drugs of un-
known potentiality and in giving warning; but in the absence of
evidence that this standard has not been met, they have refused
to hold the maker liable for the unforeseeable harm. .. !
One of the key theories used in finding that there is no liability has
been that since there is no knowledge of the risk, it is impossible
for the manufacturer to give any warning.
This theory was mentioned in one of the most recent cases in
this area, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products, Corp." The plain-
tiff developed asbestosis after working with asbestos insulation for
a number of years. It was found that it was known that such work
could lead to the worker developing asbestosis, but the court dis-
cussed the problem of the unknowable risk in its decision. After
noting that the seller is not the insurer of his product, the court, in
applying comment j45 to section 402A, said:
[A] seller has a responsibility to inform users and consumers of
dangers which the seller knows or should know at the time the
product is sold. The requirement that the danger be reasonably
foreseeable, or scientifically discoverable, is an important limita-
tion of the seller's liability."
The strict liability theory, then, involves negligence concepts when
the question of warning is involved.
Similar reasoning was used in Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.4"
The plaintiff was given the drug Aralen which was manufactured
by the defendant for a skin disease. The plaintiff suffered a reaction
to the drug and lost most of her vision. After deciding that there
was a jury question as to whether or not the risk was knowable,
43. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, p. 661 (4th ed. 1971).
44. CCH Prod. Liab. R. 1 7010 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973).
45. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment j, provides in part:
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number
of the population are allergic, and the ingredient in one whose danger is not generally
known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find
in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge,
or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresignt should have
knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger. ...
46. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., CCH Prod. Liab. R. 1 7010 at p. 12,213;
see also Winthrop Laboratories Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Crocker, CCH Prod. Liab.
R 9 7089 (Tex. Civ. App. Nov. 21, 1973).
47. 416 F.2d 417 (2nd Cir. 1969).
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the court applied the rule of comment k of section 402A which says
that if there is an adequate warning given, the product is not defec-
tive nor is it unreasonably dangerous." This rule adopts the ordi-
nary negligence concepts as to the duty to warn. If it is impossible
to know that the risk exists, there is, therefore, no duty to warn
the user or consumer. 9 This reasoning results in the finding that a
product is not defective even if there is no warning if there was no
duty to warn in the first instance. 50
Two California cases apply the same reasoning. Christofferson
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital51 involved Aralen, the same drug
involved in the Basko case. Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural
Chemicals2 involved a plaintiff who suffered a severe skin condi-
tion as a result of contact with a weed killing chemical manufac-
tured and distributed by the defendants. Both of these cases held
that there is no defect if there is an adequate warning and whether
or not the warning is adequate is to be determined on a basis of
ordinary negligence.
The rulings in these and similar cases, 53 as well as the com-
ments to section 402A, limit the definitions of the terms "defec-
tive" and "unreasonably dangerous" by allowing the seller to give
warnings of dangers. Negligence concepts, rather than those of
strict liability, apply to the determination of whether the warnings
were adequate. Under the negligence theory, there is no duty to
warn if the risk is scientifically unknowable. 4 This view of the
terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" under strict lia-
bility seeks to protect the consumer, but not at the expense of a
seller or manufacturer who could not possibly know of the risk
involved in the use of the product.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As has been noted, strict liability in tort has been applied to
products liability cases on a public policy determination that the
consumer should be protected from the dangers involved in the use
48. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment k.
49. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2nd Cir. 1969).
50. Winthrop Laboratories Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Crocker, CCH Prod. Liab. R
1 7089 at p. 12,501 (Tex. Civ. App. Nov. 21, 1973).
51. 15 Cal. App. 3d 80, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1972).
52. 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969).
53. See Eisbach v. Jo-Carroll Electric Coop., Inc., 440 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1971);
Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963); and Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
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of defective products. Since the doctrine of strict liability is based
on public policy, courts must define the terms used in applying the
doctrine by examining those public policy considerations. The im-
portance of the various factors making up the policy considerations
are given different weight by the courts and the writers and, there-
fore, the conclusions reached are in conflict.
A. Support for the imposition of liability even where the risk is
scientifically unknowable
There are many who feel that liability should be imposed on
the manufacturers of defective products regardless of the fact that
the risk was scientifically unknowable. They feel that the protec-
tion of the consumer is of the utmost importance and, since the
manufacturer made the product and usually has a deeper pocket,
they feel the loss should be shifted to the manufacturer.
Paul D. Rheingold, in one of the earlier articles concerning this
problem, takes the position that the policy considerations lead to
the conclusion that even where the risk is unknowable, liability
should be imposed. 5 By imposing liability, he believes: (1) it is
possible that the manufacturer will proceed with even more care
and use more tests for an earlier detection of the risk; and (2) the
desirable effect of inducing the manufacturer to spread the loss by
either obtaining insurance or otherwise providing for the contin-
gency of harm will result. At the same time, he argues that: (1)
firms will not be driven into bankruptcy; (2) competition within the
particular industry will keep companies researching, developing
and marketing new products; (3) the cost of products will not rise
appreciably because of mass marketing; and (4) it is not undesira-
ble that products be kept off the market for further testing if it
means safer products." If these arguments are accepted as true, it
would seem that there would not only be benefits for the injured
party, but also, major benefits for the general public through safer
products. The only burden would be a minimal increase in prices.
In a series of articles, Page Keeton advocates that strict liabil-
ity be imposed unless the benefits of the product outweigh the harm
to which users of it are exposed. If the product is a very useful or
necessary one, the injured party doesn't recover because the public
good is better served by having the product on the market. 7 In an
55. P. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18
RUTGERS L. REV. 947 (1964).
56. Id. at 1015-1017.
57. P. Keeton, supra note 13, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 571.
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article dealing solely with the problems involved with birth control
pills, another author applies similar reasoning and suggests that
since birth control pills are not designed to treat illnesses and are
only one method of birth control, their usefulness is not that great
in comparison to the possible harm which may be caused by them.
Therefore, birth control pills, it is argued, should be distinguished
from medicinal drugs and strict liability should be applied to the
manufacturers of "the pill."5
In Brody v. Overlook Hospital,59 the court felt that the imposi-
tion of strict liability will have the effect of encouraging research
and more careful use of products. Also, the loss will cause no
undue burden on anyone since it will be spread out over all users
and consumers.
The various policy considerations noted, all put the greatest
weight on the protection of the consumer. If strict liability is im-
posed on this reasoning, the manufacturer, for all practical pur-
poses, becomes the insurer of his product for harm caused by its
normal use. The arguments find this acceptable because the manu-
facturer can pass on his losses in this regard to the general public
by increasing the cost of the product.
B. Opposition to the imposition of strict liability where the risk
is scientifically unknowable.
The policy considerations listed in the preceding section do
have the protection of the consumer in mind. However, those who
feel strict liability should not be imposed in situations where the
risk is scientifically unknowable feel that the reasons given by those
who favor it break down when the risk is unknowable.
One of the most critical attacks on the proponents' reasoning
is made by Paul Connolly." First of all, Connolly points out that
where the risk itself is unknown, the seller is in no position to
spread the loss. The manufacturer has no way of estimating the
amount of the loss, if any, or how often it will happen, if ever.
Therefore, it could not pass the cost on by increasing the sales price
because there is no way to determine how much the increase should
be.
Where the manufacturer cannot spread the risk, he should not,
58. Comment, Liability of Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS L. REV.
1526 (1972).
59. 121 N.J. Super, 299, 296 A.2d 688 (1972).
60. P. Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent
in His Product, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 303 (1965).
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it would seem, be liable for the defect, because there would be
no justification for making him liable. The only difference be-
tween him and the consumer in this case is that he has the deeper
pocket.6
Connolly also objects to the utility of the product versus the poten-
tial harm approach. His objection is on two grounds: (1) it would
be difficult to place values on the utility and the risk and the court
is probably not the best agency to make this judgment; and (2) if
a manufacturer is to be encouraged to market new products for the
benefit of society, it is not proper for the court to make a determi-
nation of whether the product was worth the risk on an after-the-
fact basis.62
In Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 3 which dealt with
the problems of the cigarette cases, the court recognized the fact
that unknowable risks can't be considered a cost of production:
Public policy demands that the burden of any accidental injuries
caused by such products be placed upon those who produce and
market the products and know the risks. The injuries from know-
able risks are a cost of production for the industry to bear ....
[The manufacturer] is an insurer against foreseeable risks-but
not against unknowable risks.6"
The reasoning of this case is that where the risk is knowable, the
manufacturer can protect against it both by spreading the loss and
by taking steps to prevent the harm, but where the risk is unknow-
able, it can do neither.
Courts have also stated that the manufacturer is not the insurer
of its product.65 To give any meaning to this statement, it would
be necessary to excuse from liability manufacturers when the risk
of their products are unknowable. If liability was extended this far,
all grounds would be covered where the user or consumer uses the
product as intended by the manufacturer.
Another reason put forth for limiting liability where the risk is
unknowable is that to do so might effectively reduce the sufficient
user experience indispensable to research." This is particularly
61. Id. at 307.
62. Id. at 306.
63. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
64. Id. at 36-37.
65. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., CCH Prod. Liab. R. 1 7010 (5th Cir.
Sept. 10, 1973); see also note 12.
66. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2nd Cir. 1969) and Christofferson v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 15 Cal. App. 3d 80, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1972).
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important in drug and chemical cases. For some products, use by
individuals is the only way tests can be thoroughly conducted.
When this is true, the imposition of strict liability is seen as a true
deterrent.
One further policy consideration should be pointed out. One of
the justifications for imposing strict liability is that the manufac-
turer is in a better position to remove the risks in its products or
to take precautions so that the risk will not cause injury.17 This
does not fit the situation where the risk is scientifically unknow-
able. When this is the case, there is nothing the manufacturer can
do because it wouldn't know there is a problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The situation with which this comment deals has resulted in
different conclusions by different courts and writers. The terms
"defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" are subject to definitions
which could go either way on the question. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to look primarily to the policy considerations underlying strict
liability in tort to determine whether or not liability should be
imposed.
The prime policy arguments made by those who feel strict
liability should be applied in all cases are that, in order to protect
the consumer, the loss should be shifted to the manufacturer
and/or seller because he is in a better position to spread the loss
and because he is in a superior position to protect against the risk.
It appears, however, that neither of these arguments are applicable
where the risk is scientifically unknowable. It would seem that it
is impossible to consider such a risk a cost of production to be
passed on to the public. This is so because there is absolutely no
way to anticipate the unknowable and give it a monetary value to
be added to the sales price. Also, the manufacturer or seller is in
no better position to protect against the risk since they don't know
there is one and, no matter what they do, they can't detect it.
Imposing liability will not have a great impact on improving re-
search and testing procedures because the manufacturer has done
all he could already.
The "utility of the product versus the risk of harm" test also
seems improper because the determination is being made after the
risk is known, while the decision to market the product was made
67. See Tucson Industries, Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 504 P.2d 936 (1973).
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without any such knowledge. To impose liability where the utility
is less than the risk of harm and to excuse the manufacturer when
the risk is less than the utility of the product is an artificial distinc-
tion. Also, under this approach, the injured person is denied recov-
ery where the product is more useful to the public, but he is allowed
recovery, and, therefore, the loss supposedly spread to all consum-
ers, where it is found that the risk of harm is greater than the utility
of the product to those same consumers.
Although the injured user or consumer of a product should be
protected, the mere fact that the manufacturer has the deeper
pocket should not be the controlling factor. The injured party need
not prove negligence on the part of the defendant, but he should
be required to prove that either the defendant could have found and
corrected the defect had he utilized all scientific knowledge avail-
able to him or he could have given a warning so that the consumer
could have taken precautionary measures. The manufacturer of a
product which has a scientifically unknowable risk inherent in it
should be excused from liability under strict liability in tort.
RICHARD E. BYRNE
INDUSTRY-WIDE JOINT LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The issue presented in this article is whether or not an entire
industry may be held jointly and severally liable under a theory of
strict liability for injuries caused by its products. In its broadest
form, this concept of industry-wide joint liability could impose
liability upon an entire industry if the plaintiff could show that: 1)
there was an injury caused to him by a product of that industry;
2) the product was defective, unreasonably dangerous and it
reached the plaintiff without substantial change in its condition;1
3) the manufacturers adhered to an industry-wide custom in pro-
ducing the product.2 Whether or not the actual manufacturer could
be identified would be irrelevant since all of the manufacturers
would be liable for the action of one of them.
Industry-wide joint liability should be differentiated from two
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT § 402A].
2. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text infra.
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